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Mobilizing Science in the Heartland:
Iowa State College,
the State University of Iowa, and
National Science during World War II
JOANNE ABEL GOLDMAN
ONE YEAR after the end of World War II, historian James
Phinney Baxter reflected on the unprecedented research pro-
grams that the U.S. government had supported during the war
and noted that "except for the development of the atomic bomb
this [the radio proximity fuse program] constitutes perhaps the
most remarkable scientific achievement of the war."' Scientists
at both Iowa State College (ISC) and the State University of Iowa
(SUl) played roles in these two "remarkable" scientific achieve-
ments. ISC chemists developed methods to purify uranium in
large quantities and at reduced costs. Their effort was critical to
the success of the Manhattan Project, which culminated in the
construction of the atomic bomb. Across the state, at SUI, an-
other war-related research program involved extensive study
and testing of the variable time (VT) proximity fuse that im-
proved its capabilities and subsequent effectiveness.
There are several parallels between the solicited research
programs at SUI and ISC. For instance, both programs found
The research and writing of this article was supported in part by summer fel-
lowships and a professional development leave from the Graduate College of
the University of Northem Iowa, and by a research grant from the State His-
torical Society of Iowa.
1. James Phirmey Baxter 3rd, Scientists Against Time (Boston, 1946), 222.
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themselves in the business of production as well as research.
ISC scientists purified uranium for the war effort, and SUI
physicists tested and assembled fuses. Howevei; differences in
managerial models and in the ways the programs were inte-
grated into the urüversities' administratioris had more lasting
implications than the similarities between the two programs.
After the war, when the federal government decided to con-
tinue to fund scientific research, it continued the contractual re-
lationship with ISC that had proved so successful during the war.
The wartime research program directed by scientist/manager
Frank Spedding became the Ames Laboratory, and ISC admin-
istered the federal contract that supported it. The presence of a
national laboratory on the ISC campus had a profound effect on
the way the physical science departments grew in the 1950s and
1960s. Programs within those departments became closely inte-
grated with the associated divisions at the laboratory. In con-
trast, the work at SUI was terminated at the war's end, and the
national science program had litfle effect on the way the physics
department developed. After the war, SUI strengthened its
prewar programs and nurtured the interests and opportunities
brought by new faculty. Little, if any, legacy or memory of the
proximity fuse program remains at SUI.
Many historians have examined the partnership between
the federal government and academia that developed during
the two world wars and became institutionalized with the crea-
tion of national laboratories in the postwar period.^ This study.
2. Some of that vast scholarship that has been particularly relevant to this
study is Richard Rhodes, The Makitig of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986);
Larry Owens, "The Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second
World War: Vannevar Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Develop-
ment," Business History Review 68 (1994), 515-65; Stuart W. Leslie, Tlie Cold War
and American Sdence: The Military-lndiistrial-Academic Complex at MW and Stanford
(New York, 1993); Amy Sue Bix, "Backing into Sponsored Research: Physics
and Engineering at Princeton University," History of Higher Education Annual
13 (1993), 9-53; Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Sdence Policy and Universities:
Consequences of Success," Daedalus 122 (1993), 197-224; Leon M. Lederman,
"Science: The End of the Frontier?" Science 251 (11 January 1991), 3-20; Robert
W. Seidel, "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's Labo-
ratory System," Historical Studies in tlie Physical and Biological Sciences 16 (1986),
135-75; Nathan Reingold, "Science and Government in the United States Since
1945," History of Science 32 (1994), 361-86; Arnold Thackray, ed., "Sdence After
'40," Osiris 7 (1992); and Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds.. Big Science: The
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which focuses on the wartime solicited research programs at
SUI and ISC, complements that body of literature by providing
two additional case studies that contrast two very different in-
stitutior\s with very different missions executing federal con-
tracts during World War 11 in very different ways. Interestingly,
the implications of the government's solicited research program
at SUI and ISC run counter to the experiences at many other
institutioris.^ At neither ISC nor SUI did the solicited research
program fundamentally change the character of the schools.
Rather, the growth of the physical sciences at ISC was consistent
with its land-grant mission from its inception. Similarly, the
termination of the contract at SUI did not alter the trajectory of
that institution either, but rather allowed it to return to its pre-
war agenda.
IOWA STATE COLLEGE had a particularly long tradition of
involvement with federal programs. In 1864, just two years after
Congress passed the Morrill Act, Iowa became the first state in
the nation to take advantage of its provisions and awarded the
grant to the Iowa Agricultural College. (In 1886, its name ap-
peared in the college catalog as Iowa State College of Agriculture
and Mechanic Arts; however, the state did not officially approve
the name change until 1896.) The Morrill Act allowed federal
and state governments to finance institutions of higher learning
Growth of Large-Scale Research (Stanford, CA, 1992). See also the three-volume
History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission: Richard G. Hewlett and
Oscar E. Anderson Jr., The New World, 1939-1946 (Berkeley, CA, 1990); Richard
G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947-1952 (Berkeley, CA, 1990);
and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961:
Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley, CA, 1989). For particu-
lar laboratories, see Robert P. Crease, Making Physics: À Biography of Brookhaven
National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999); J. L. Heübron and Robert W.
Seidel, Lawrence and His Laboratory: A History of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
(Berkeley, CA, 1989); Lillian Hoddeson et al.. Critical Assembly: A Technical His-
tory of Los Alamos during the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (New York, 1993);
Jack M. Holl, Argonne National Laboratory, 1946-1996 (Urbana, IL, 1997); and
Michèle Stenehjem Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Han-
ford Nuclear Site (Lincoln, NE, 1992).
3. Joanne Abel Goldman, "National Science in the Nation's Heartland: The
Ames Laboratory and Iowa State University, 1942-1965," Technology and Cul-
ture Al (2000), 435-59.
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that provided programs of practical study in the agricultural and
mechanical arts—thus creating land-grant colleges. In 1871 this
mandate broadened to include coursework in "domestic econ-
omy," primarily for women. As a result, ISC established one of
the first home economics programs in the country."* Further fed-
eral support for agriculture and the mechanic arts (engineering)
continued in the years that followed. In 1888, just one year after
the Hatch Act authorized the establishment of agricultural ex-
periment stations in the land-grant colleges, ISC's agricultural
experiment station was founded. This federal-state-college part-
nership continued into the twentieth century: the state legislature
provided for an engineering experimer\t station in 1904, agri-
cultural and home economic extension services in 1906, and en-
gineering extension in 1913. Although initially each of these fa-
cilities was supported with state allocations, the Smith-Lever
Act of 1914 provided federal support for exter\sion programs at
those institutions supported by the Morrill Act.
Indeed, a partnership between the federal and state govern-
ments and ISC distinguished its particular pattern of growth and
development. SUI, on the other hand, was neither conceived in
this tradition nor did it develop strengths in agriculture or the
mechanical arts as ISC did. Rather, the state legislature, together
with early administrators, sought to balance classical with prac-
tical education at SUI.^  The department of chemistry and natural
philosophy played a key role in achieving this goal. In the 1860s,
the department attracted national and international attention as
it pioneered laboratory-based science education." In 1888 the
physics department broke off from the department of chemistry
and natural philosophy, and during the next eighty years its
international prominence fluctuated as the identity of the de-
partment and the university evolved. A significant turnover in
faculty in the early 1920s provided an opportunity to introduce
new blood and new interests. While acoustics confinued to be
4. Earle D. Ross, A History of the loiua State College of Agriculture and Mechanic
Arts (Ames, 1942), 130-31, 287.
5. John C. Gerber, A Pictorial History of the University of Iowa (Iowa City, 1988),
25-28.
6. James P. Wells, Anuals of a University of lozva Department: From Natural Phi-
losophy to Physics and Astronomy (Iowa City, 1980), 35-40.
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an important area of research, new physicists brought interests
in materials research, particle-wave theory, and nuclear physics
to the department. Its reputation soared during the interwar
years, when department chairman George W. Stewart commit-
ted to showcasing the department. Preeminent physicists from
the United States and Europe added SUI to their itineraries
when touring the Midwest. Furthermore, the representation of
uruversity physicists at scholarly meetings complemented their
prolific publication record and sustained the department's visi-
bility in national and intemational circles.^
By contrast, before World War 11 the primary mandate of the
physical sciences at ISC was to complement the university's em-
phasis on agriculture and engineering. As such, both the physics
and chemistry departments had an applied rather than theoreti-
cal thrust. Chemistry was the larger of the two programs and
offered the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees. Physics had an applied
physics graduate program but did not develop a general one
until the 1950s.'
Both ISC and SUI enthusiastically supported U.S. involve-
ment in World War I, and the federal govemment called on the
institutions' strengths to serve military needs. They mobilized
the agriculture and engineering programs at ISC for research
and recruited prominent scientists from SUI to join federal re-
search programs at various laboratories. At ISC, the agricultural
experiment station, along with the departments of home eco-
nomics, botany bacteriology, and zoology, examined issues of
food preservation and developed procedures to increase food
production. Engineering faculty and staff addressed problems
of military communication, mapping, camp construction, and
fuel conservation.^
In addition to the mobilization of campus research pro-
grams, several ISC faculty members resigned their college posts
7. Ibid., 100-101,110-14.
8. Ir\ addition to the descriptions of these programs in the college and university
catalogs, see "Exhibits in Report to President on Graduate Study in Physics at
the Two State Institutions," file 95, box 136, Handier Papers, University of Iowa
Archives, Uruversity of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City; Gerber, Pictorial History, 130;
Wells, Annals of a U! Department; and Ross, History of ISC, 140,141,158-59.
9. Ross, History of ISC, 312.
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to enlist in military research programs. Anson Marston and T. R.
Agg, the then current and future deans of engineering, joined
federal research programs, and bacteriologist Max Levine as-
sumed command of a French laboratory. Similarly, SUI physicist
George W. Stewart and psychologist Carl E. Seashore served on
the National Research Council, which President Wilson had
authorized in 1916 to coordinate the efforts of scientists in the
military's interest. Seashore helped develop the pitch-range
audiometer and diagnostic tools for wireless operators. Stewart
worked in laboratories in Washington, D.C, and Pensacola,
Florida, to improve methods to detect aircraft and submarines.
On his home campus, he, together with colleague H. L. Dodge,
developed microphones to help detect airplanes. Other col-
leagues took leaves to serve the nation at U.S. Army laboratories.
F. C. Brown joined the Ordnance Department in Washington,
D.C, to work on bomb ballistics and light reflection problems;
L. P. Sieg addressed aviation-related issues.
During World War II the federal goverr\ment stepped up its
efforts to support scientific research for the military. In 1940 a
group of the country's most prominent scientists, alarmed by
America's unpreparedness for war and Germany's advances in
Europe, prodded President Roosevelt to create the National De-
fense Research Committee (NDRC). Vannevar Bush, head of the
Carnegie Institution and the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics, became its director. Through the NDRC, Bush mo-
bilized academic scientists on many different fronts to carry out
research programs with military applications. Although some of
those scientists joined research teams at government installa-
tions. Bush expected most to remain at their home institutions
to keep academia intact and to capitalize on existing facilities.'"
The goverrunent scientists addressed a multitude of prob-
lems. Because the need for scientific research was urgent, pro-
grams grew where space, personnel, and equipment were avail-
able until optimal facilities could be created. Eventually, new
laboratories in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Hanford, Washington;
and Los Alamos, New Mexico, were built to accommodate the
10. Baxter, Scientists Against Time. 19, 20; Hewlett and Anderson, The New
World. 25.
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demands of the multifaceted scientific program. Until those lab-
oratory complexes could be built, however, research began at
existing facilities. Indeed, eminent scientists from across the
country joined teams of scientists at the Urüversity of Chicago,
Columbia Urüversity, and the University of Califorrüa at Berke-
ley to direct different aspects of the atomic energy research pro-
gram. The government also solicited industrial and private lab-
oratories. It contracted with the Camegie Institution's Depart-
ment of Terrestrial Magnetism, for example, to coordinate early
research on the proximity fuse. In addition to creating those
centers of scientific research, subcontracts were let to other aca-
demic and corporate laboratories when their facilities or per-
sormel could serve the national programs. Contracts between
the NDRC and the host ir\stitution delineated expectations and
the terms of compensation but did not specify how the institu-
tion should carry out its mission. Rather, the means employed
to execute the terms of the contract were left to the discretion of
the contractor.
In 1941 President Roosevelt created the Office of Scientific
Research and Development (OSRD) to subsume the NDRC and
appointed Bush as its director Within this new orgarüzation, the
NDRC continued to support scholarly research under the direc-
tion of James B. Conant. Two of its earliest irütiatives, the atomic
and proximity fuse programs, involved scientists at SUI and ISC
directly.
IN 1942, the OSRD recruited Arthur H. Compton, University of
Chicago physicist and Nobel laureate, and authorized him to
orgarüze a metallurgical laboratory as part of the OSRD's
atomic research program. At the Urüversity of Chicago, he as-
sembled a group of scientists to examine several aspects of
atomic energy. Compton learned of ISC chemist Frank Sped-
ding's expertise in rare earth chemistry and invited him to join
the metallurgy group." Spedding had received his Ph.D. in
11. Rare earths, or lanthanides, include 15 elements with atomic numbers 57
through 71. Several interesting properties make them noteworthy. First, most
lanthanides are nearly indistinguishable chemically since the outermost elec-
tron shells, which control most chemical interactions, are filled. While the
number of electror\s in the outermost shell usually distinguishes a particular
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chemistry from Berkeley in 1929, followed by a postdoctoral
fellowship there, a Guggenheim fellowship in Europe, and a
Baker fellowship at Cornell University. During those years
Spedding's reputation as a first-rate spectroscopist and rare
earth chemist grew. In 1937 he joined the faculty at ISC com-
plete with tenure, as he irxsisted.'
Although Compton expected Spedding to assemble a chem-
istry division within the metallurgical laboratory in Chicago at
some point, he allowed Spedding to irutiate a research program
at ISC, where the equipment and talent were already assembled.
The continued success of the group at ISC forestalled any move to
Chicago, and the program remained at ISC throughout the war.
Spedding drew staff from ISC's chemistry and physics de-
partments. Chemists Harley A. Wilhelm, John A. Wilkinson, and
Harvey Diehl, physicist R. E. Rundle, and graduate students
C. F. Gray and Adrian Daane held key positions. With the sup-
port of ISC's president, Charles E. Friley, faculty and students
maintained their academic positions while working on the proj-
ect. To compensate the college, Spedding negotiated the govern-
ment's assumption of a prorated part of their salaries propor-
tionate to their involvement in the federal program.'^ In addi-
element from its neighbor, for rare earths, it is the number of electrons in their
4f shell that varies. A second, related reason for great interest in the rare earths
is that pronounœd magnetic properties arise from the filling of the 4f shell,
leading to magnetic materials of great technological importance. There is a
natural association of rare earths with the actiniae elements such as uranium
and thorium. In fact, the acHnides are also chemically similar to the lantharudes
except that now the 5f rather than the 4f shell is filled in the series. In natural
ore, rare earths are always found as impurities with uranium and thorium.
Since the latter elements were desired in an extremely pure form for the proj-
ect, these contaminants had to be removed. In addition, when uranium and
plutonium undergo nuclear fission, rare earths are generally found among the
fission products, again prompting interest in their identificafion. See F. H.
Spedding, "Progress in Rare Earth Chemistry" (n.p., n.d.), in the Spedding
Papers at the Iowa State University Archives, Ames; E H. Spedding, "The Rare
Earths," Scientific American 185 (November 1951), 26-30; Karl A. Gschneidner
In, Rare Eartlis, The Fraternal Fifleen, A World of the Atom Series Booklet
(Washington, DC, 1966), 1-8.
12. Harry Svec, Prologue, Handbook on the Physics and Chemistry of Rare Earths,
vol. 11, ed. K. A. Gschneidner Jr. and L. Eyring (New York, 1988), 8.
13. Contract No. W-7405 eng-7,14 May 1945, Department of Energy Records of
the History Division, Washington, DC.
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tion, he tapped professional networks to recruit scientists: I. B.
Johns, an ISC Ph.D., retumed from Monsanto Chemical in Bos-
ton; Wayne Keller was recruited from Cornell University, Adolf
Voigt from Smith College, and Amos Newton and W. H. Sulli-
van from industry. During the war, the scientific staff alone ex-
ceeded one hundred.
Spedding directed the Ames Project, and Wilhelm and Johns
became associate directors of the laboratory—V\^helm managed
the metallurgical programs and Johns developed a plutonium
research division.'* The program's structiH^ assumed a pyra-
midal form, and as the group expanded, its hierarchy became
more apparent. By mid-1942, section chiefs directed specific re-
search programs under the guidance of the two associate direc-
tors. Although some early industrial research and development
efforts adopted this model, it was a relatively new type of organ-
ization for American universities, where, in general, compara-
tively small research groups pursued studies independently"
This pyramidal orgarùzational model was particularly well
suited to the solicited research program. It clarified relation-
ships and authority and facilitated the integration of research
efforts that kept work in Ames progressing despite Spedding's
frequent absences. That was important since he spent only half
of each week in Ames and the other half in Chicago to coordi-
nate ISC's program with the metallurgical laboratory. On Sun-
day monüngs, Spedding met with the senior members of the
group to review the past week's work and plan for the next
week's effort. Spedding's colleague Harry Svec noted that "the
breadth of the work is such that the coworkers were many but
the inspiration and drive to do the work was largely due to
Spedding's perception of what needed to be done, how it
should be done and when it should be accomplished."'*
14. Johns moved this plutonium program to the Los Alamos Laboratory in 1944.
15. In the late 1920s and 1930s, Emest Orlando Lawrence's laboratory at Berke-
ley became the prototype of this type of organization for academic research.
Under Lawrence's leadership, assistant directors, crew chiefs, and other desig-
nated group leaders directed particular lines of cyclotron research. The hier-
archical structure defined relationships, responsibility, and authority, pre-
sumably increasing the pace and efficiency of directed research. Robert W.
Seidel, "A Home for Big Science," 39.
16. Svec, Prologue, 7.
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The highly classified nature of the work further strength-
ened Spedding's authority. Even ISC's president, Charles Friley,
was ignorant of the details of the work until he received the
necessary security clearances several weeks after the project be-
gan. Nevertheless, from the beginning Friley wholeheartedly
supported the war-related research work.'^ He ordered the ad-
ministration to fully comply with any of Dr. Spedding's requi-
sitions. On at least one occasion, this sweeping mandate caused
concem and contributed to the "Whiskey Barrel Incident," one
of the most talked about local anecdotes from this period of
ISC's history."
Friley's attitude towards the solicited research program ex-
tended well beyond support for Spedding's work. Perhaps most
importantly, Friley's nonintervention policy gave Spedding ex-
traordinary authority and autonomy to manage the program.
Spedding negotiated contracts with Washington, developed the
laboratory in Ames, and directed the research program, albeit
within the guidelines set by Compton.
Despite initial plans to capitalize on Spedding's rare earth
expertise, the more urgent problem was how to obtain a high
purity urarüum in bulk quantity, so the rare earth program was
put on hold. By September 1942, the group had developed the
"bomb reduction method" to purify uranium.'** That process
17. Earle D. Ross, The Land Grant Idea at Iowa State College: A Centennial Tuai
Balance, 1858-1958 (Ames, 1958), 210-26.
18. When the Ames group needed containers to dispose of the uraruum slag,
Wayne Keller, senior chemist, suggested that exhausted whiskey barrels might
work well. In Keller's hometown in Kentucky, the Hiram Walker Whiskey
Company regularly used barrels during the process of aging whiskey but had
no use for them after the liquor was bottled. They would be perfect receptacles
for the waste. Spedding submitted an order for 1,000 barrels. Inadvertently, the
typist did not specify empty barrels. In addition to any moral misgivings of
hilfilUng such a request, state law restricted liquor sales, which left the pur-
chasing office in a quandary. In light of the presidential order for steadfast
compliance, the office called Spedding at 6:30 a.m., and he rectified the error.
Reportedly, once the barrels were delivered, students flocked to the railroad to
unload them. Apparently word had spread that when cocked just so, a cup of
whiskey could be retrieved from each barrel. This story has been told many
times with some variation. This version was taken from the newsletter for the
employees of Ames Laboratory, Insider (December, 1992), 4.
19. Until that time, production of uranium was extremely difficult, and the
product when made was usually highly contaminated. By breaking with con-
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Cedil Finch lets down a heating collar in a furnace that
heated uranium with other elements. Photo courtesy of
the Ames Laboratory, U.S. Departmeiit of Energy.
yielded the metal at a degree of purity not achieved earlier, at
reduced costs, so uraruum production became the group's top
priority. By the following month, they were purifying an aver-
age of 100 pounds of uranium per week, and the rate increased
steadily. The metal was sent to Chicago, where scientists assem-
ventional assumptions about uranium, Wilhelm's group overcame these prob-
lems. Rather than working with uranium oxide, they found that the reduction
of uranium tetrafluoride with a salt, rather than hydrogen, in the graphite cru-
cible they developed did indeed produce pure uranium. See "A Brief History
of the Atomic Energy Project under the Direction of F. H. Spedding at Iowa
State College," box IAR 1945-1946,1946-1947, Friley Papers, Iowa State Uni-
versity Archives.
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bled the uranium briquettes in a carefully defined matrix, with
graphite as a moderator, and on December 2, 1942, successfully
demonstrated the feasibility of a chain reaction. That demon-
stration, and its implications for the ultimate success of the
Manhattan Project, stimulated an even more urgent need for the
ntaterials, keeping the Ames group in the production business,
at least for the time being.'" In July 1943, Harley VWlhelm, Sped-
ding's associate director, led a team that instructed scientists at
the Mallinckrodt Corporation, the DuPont Corporation, and the
Electrometallurgical Division of Urüon Carbide Co. to produce
metal via the Ames process. However, until the work was effec-
tively transferred to the private sector, the Ames operation car-
ried the burden, producing more than two million pounds of
metal by the war's end.''
After the demand for uranium calmed, Spedding's group
applied the same techniques used in the production of urarüum
to thorium, beryllium, and cerium. Thorium was sought to fuel
the breeder reactors that could supplement the expected short-
fall in the availability of U-235. Beryllium and cerium were par-
ticularly suited to the crucibles that withstood the bomb reduc-
tion of thorium and plutorüum, respectively. Furthermore, be-
ryllium was found to be an effective moderator for nuclear re-
actions. Though never reaching the level of uranium production,
sigrüficant quantities of these metals were produced by Ames
scientists."
Toward the end of the war, the group at ISC, in addition to
its materials production, finally turned to the study of the rare
earths, their initial charge. Although rare earths were so named
because many believed that they were rare, they do, in fact, exist
naturally in sigrüficant quantities. Nevertheless, even after they
20. After the success of the pile in Chicago, most of the uranium purified in
Ames was shipped to Hanford, Washington, and Oak Ridge, Termessee, for
use in reactors there.
21. E. I. Fulmer, "History of Ames Project," unpublished report, 9 December
194Ó, 7-15, Spedding Papers, ISU Archives. See also Supplement No. 9 to
Contract No. W-7405-Eng-7, effective date 12 January 1945, Department of
Energy, History Division.
22. Fulmer, "History of Ames Project," 15-20; Hewlett and Anderson, The New
World, 29,286-87.
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were identified, they remained relatively neglected because sepa-
rating the various rare earths from one another was extremely
difficult. Prior to the work of Spedding's group, separating the
"rarest" of these elements with any significant degree of purity
required as many as 40,000 distinct operations. Indeed, some
scientists spent their entire professional lives refining a rare
earth to 99 percent purity. This labor-intensive process of sepa-
ration produced only limited quantities. Therefore, the proper-
ties and usefulness of rare earth elements remained relatively
unexplored. In 1945, Spedding, along with other members of his
group, solved this bottleneck in rare earth research by exploit-
ing a process that produced rare earths at 99.99 percent purity."
The government authorized the construction of a pilot plant to
separate the metals, and, until industry assumed production,
ISC produced most of the purified rare earths available.
After the war, the solicited research program continued at
ISC unabated. The study of the rare earths and thorium, as well
as much of their production, dominated work in the years im-
mediately following the war and continued well into the 1950s."
ISC's leadership in rare earth research continues to this day
through its Rare-Earth Information Center.^ The program that
developed during the war created an institutional framework
that became the foundation of the postwar solicited research
program. The dominant features of that framework—Sped-
ding's authority, the pyramidal model, and the close ties be-
tween ISC and the Ames Project—continued to characterize
the laboratory in the postwar period.
IN CONTRAST to the situation in Ames, the solicited research
program at SUI ended with the cessation of hostilities and of-
23. Fulmer, "History of Ames Project, 41-42, describes the process that was
employed. See also Gschneidner, "Rare Earths," 6,10-11; and Spedding, "The
Rare Earths," 26.
24. Spedding, "The Operation and Scope of the Ames Laboratory of the Atomic
Energy Commission," p.l2, folder Speeches, 1960-1962, box Z, Spedding Papers.
25. This center provides a central databank with information on "collecting,
storing, evaluating and disseminating rare earth information" to the technical
and scientific communities. See their website at www.extemal.ameslab.gov/ric/
for more information.
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fered little in the way of long-term impact on the physics depart-
ment at SUI. Rather than people and equipment being shared
with the associated department, as was the case at ISC, the so-
licited research program grew increasingly distinct from the
university, particularly as the project expanded. Moreover, no
dominant figure emerged with significant authority or au-
tonomy over either the laboratory or those departments associ-
ated with it. Instead, authority remained diffuse as the scientists
in the program served several masters.
The proximity fuse program set out to maximize the de-
structive impact of weapons, particularly those targeting air-
craft. These radar devices were placed in shells, rockets, and
bombs to trigger an explosion at a predetermined distance from
the target. Although this optimum range could be calculated,
variables in the manufacture, setting, timing, and environment
rendered the fuses unpredictable. Work on this problem had
been under way for some time both in the international com-
munity and in the U.S. Navy's Council for Research, but little
progress had been made. C^ ne of the NDRC's first initiatives
was to begin a fuse research program at the Department of Ter-
restrial Magnetism (DTM), directed by Merle A. Tuve, in Wash-
ington, DC.^ ^
In 1940 Tuve consulted Alexander Ellett, professor of nuclear
physics at SUI. Soon after, Ellett joined the program full time.
Almost immediately. Tuve and Ellett decided to divide the pro-
gram into two principal efforts. Tuve focused on shells and
moved his operation to Johns Hopkins University. There he es-
tablished what would later become the Applied Physics Labo-
ratory. Ellett assumed direction of that part of fuse development
associated with bombs and rockets and set up his laboratory at
the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) in Washington, DC. It
is not clear why Ellett moved to the NBS rather than remain at
SUI. Proximity to Tuve may have been the initial consideration.
Nevertheless, a year and a half later, he called on his old col-
leagues to set up a small branch laboratory at SUI. Although
work was subcontracted to Iowa, Ellett remained at the NBS.
His former student and colleague James A. Jacobs directed the
26. Baxter, Scientists Against Time, 221-42.
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Tlw National Bureau of Standards designed different types of radio prox-
imity fuses to mount on different weapons. Harry Diamond, chief of the
NBS Ordnance Development Division (left), holds the mortar fuse
mounted on an 81 mm mortal shell. Alexander Ellett, chief of Division 4
of the National Defense Research Council (right), holds an unmounted
mortar fuse. Photo (1946) courtesy of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
program on site, and associates from the departments of physics
and engineering assisted him."
Initially, this branch laboratory identified and corrected de-
sign problems and developed equipment to test the electronics
of the fuses, but the laboratory's charge grew steadily. In June
1944 the lab began field-testing to examine the effect of storage
environments on the fuses. In February 1945, when the NDRC
authorized a six-fold expar\sion, the project was renamed the
Physics-Engineering Development Program (PEDP). A pilot
27. Jacobs earned his Ph.D. from the University of Iowa in 1941 and became an
assistant professor of "nuclear problems" there the following year. The most
complete treatment of the program developed at the University of Iowa is
Wells, Anmls of a UÎ Department, 141-66.
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plant provided for design improvements to be incorporated
into the manufacturing process, and large-scale production of
the prototypes followed. While research continued in Iowa City,
both on and off campus, the PEDP also leased a site north of
Clinton, Iowa. This isolated, secure, but accessible location
suited the volatile nature of the expanded program. Initially,
production goals were set at 50 to 75 units per day, but by June
1945 the government's requisition reached 100 fuses per day, a
mere fraction of the millions of fuses that the government hoped
to produce at facilities throughout the country. ^
In March 1945 the NDRC sent Lucien L. Friez to Iowa to
manage the expansion and the day-to-day operations of the lab-
oratory, allowing Jacobs to focus on "important duties in the
technical section" of the project." Friez, who had extensive ex-
perience in both aeronautical equipment and government work,
was an appropriate choice for general manager. Since 1919 he
had managed the family business, which, after World War I,
supplied aviation instruments to the Air Corps as well as com-
mercial airports. In 1930 he merged his company with Bendix
Aviation and ran the new conglomerate as president and gen-
eral manager until 1944. In that capacity, he developed "addi-
tional and new facilities, new machine tools for quantity pro-
duction, new and more expanded production set-ups, new as-
sembly lines, rigid inspection procedure, and all the other pro-
duction methods and production devices required for speed
and lower costs." The goverrunent recruited Friez because his
expertise and experience was so appropriate to the proximity
fuse program and, in particular, the current phase of expansion.
In theory, Friez and Jacobs complemented one another in the
management of the PEDP: Jacobs directed scientific and techni-
cal research, and Friez incorporated those improvements into the
fuses at the workbench. However, the real picture was much
28. Minutes, PED Committee, 22 ]une 1945, file 154, box 115, Hancher Papers.
Baxter, Scientists Against Time. 233, notes that at peak prüduction two million
fuses per month were manufactured "with 300 different companies and 2,000
different plants at work."
29. Virgil Hancher, SUI president, to EUett, 24 March 1945, file 154, box 115,
Hancher Papers.
30. Friez to F. M. Dawson, Dean of Engineering, 16 February 1945, ibid.
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more complex. While Jacobs apparently directed the scientific
program, albeit in cor\sultation with Ellett, Friez had little inde-
pendent authority. The general manager received orders from
three sources: the federal government, the urüversity president,
and the Physics Engineering Development Committee (PED
Committee). Alexander Ellett and John S. Rinehart, technical
aide to Division Four of the NDRC, articulated the federal inter-
est. On behalf of the government, they negotiated the contract
that defined the scope, goals, size, schedule, and budget of the
program. Furthermore, they coordinated the work in Clinton
and Iowa City with other aspects of the proxirrüty fuse research
program under way at laboratories in Maryland and Florida. '^
In contrast to Friley at ISC, SUI president Virgil Hancher
assumed a very active role in managing the PEDP. He was cen-
tral to negotiations of the irütial contracts, the subsequent ex-
pansion, and the leasing of downtown and proving ground
properties.^^ At the same time, Hancher defined boundaries that
firmly distinguished the urüversity from the military research
project it admirüstered. In March 1944, George Stewart, head
of the Department of Physics, confirmed that "this project has
no connection with either the basic research or the teaching of
the University. The University is converüently the contractor."^
During negotiations the following year, Hancher reiterated that
Ellett's proposal "would not bring the project within any college
or department, but would make it an independent affair re-
sponsible orüy to the President's office."^ *
31. Memorandum, Allin Dakin to Virgil Hancher, Subject PED Organization
and Operation, n.d.; Rinehart to Hancher, 8 March 1945; Irvin Stewart, con-
tracting officer, OSRD, to Hancher, 6 April 1945; transcript of telephone con-
versations between Dawson and Rinehart, 24 March 1945, and between Priez
and Rinehart, 21 August 1945; Minutes, PED Committee, 22 June 1945, all in
Hancher Papers.
32. Ibid. Por insights into Hancher's personality and management style, see Stow
Persor\s, Vie University of Iowa in the Twentieth Century: An Institutional History
(Iowa City, 1990), 145.
33. G. W. Stewart to Hancher, 31 March 1944, file 183, box 93, Hancher Papers.
34. Virgil M. Hancher, "Memorandum: Proposal for Additional War Research,
Physics-Engineering Proposal By Ellett," 27 January 1945, file 115, box 154,
Handier Papers.
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The PED Committee ostensibly represented the university's
interests. It cor\sisted of the engineering dean, Francis Dawson;
the administrative dean, AUin Dakin; the liberal arts dean, Harry
Newbum (replaced by Earl McGrath in the summer of 1945);
the chair of the physics department, George Stewart; and the
uruversity's business manager, Fred Ambrose. They supervised
the PEDP, set "general" policy, leased properties, directed FHez,
particularly in his dealings with the OSRD, and integrated the
different divisions of the program.'^
The manner in which the PEDP was orgaruzed prevented
any concentration of authority that could effectively alter the
course of the physics department. Furthermore, because Friez
had no personal or professional ties to the university, only a
limited bond between the PEDP and the physics department
developed. Moreover, Hancher introduced personnel policies
that kept the project distinct from the university. Faculty who
chose to become part of the PEDP were forced to resign their
positions within the university and forgo their rights to tenure,
retirement, and benefits. This could be circumvented with ap-
proval of the dean and president, but only if the scientist agreed
to work at the prevailing university salary rate, rather than the
premium rate paid by the PEDP. If they agreed to those terms,
faculty members could take a leave from the university, rather
than resign, and retain their academic status. The PED Com-
mittee approved this, as well as most of Hancher's initiatives,
before they were implemented.^*
To carry out its mandate, the PEDP was divided into four
divisions: research; model; production; and administration, se-
curity, and maintenance. Friez integrated the work of these divi-
sions, but he did not direct their internal operations. In a man-
ner becoming increasingly characteristic of large-scale research,
35. Transcript of telephone conversation between Ellett and Hancher, 27 lanuary
1945. See also Minutes, PED Committee, 22 March, 16 April, 26 May, 7,14, 22,
and 27 lune, and 21 September 1945, file 154, box 115, Hancher Papers.
36. This policy was enacted despite the protests of Dean Dawson and De-
partment of Physics Chair George Stewart. Hancher to Dawson 14 May 1945;
Dawson and Stewart to Hancher, 15 May 1945; and Hancher to Dawson and
Stewart, 17 May 1945, all in file 154, box 115, Hancher Papers. Nevertheless,
the PED Committee approved the plan and it became policy on 26 May 1945,
See Minutes, PED Committee, 26 May 1945, file 154, box 115, Hancher Papers.
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hierarchies within each section carried out their respective noan-
dates. Division heads coordinated the work of group leaders
who, in turn, directed staffs to carry out particular responsibili-
ties. In the research division, Jacobs, assisted by three "staff
members," determined the scientific, development, and engi-
neering programs that were carried out by associates and as-
sistants rariked according to their education and experience.
The model division of the PEDP developed prototypes based on
the improvements that the research division introduced. A
master instrument maker directed mechanical and electrorüc
instrument makers emd num,erous technicians to execute this
charge. Once the prototypes passed inspection, the production
division assumed responsibility for their manufacture and as-
sembly. Friez managed that operation directly. The production
manager answered directly to him and, in turn, supervised the
work of the production foreman, assembly foreman, production-
planning superintendent of maintenance, and chief inspector.
Each of those department heads managed a technical staff to
carry out their assigrunents. Even the administration, security,
and maintenance division assumed this hierarchical model. A
junior supervisor managed the office, and the secretaries super-
vised the clerks, typists, and stenographers. Similarly, the trans-
portation clerk directed the work of his assistants. The purchas-
ing, timekeeping, storekeeping, and janitorial staffs were rela-
tively small and less formally organized."
Despite this elaborate organization, the PEDP never reached
optimum productivity. The NDRC identified chronic under-
staffing as the crux of the problem, and by the end of June 1945
called for a 50 percent increase in the stafifs of the research divi-
sion as well as the administration, security, and maintenance di-
vision. The situation in the model and producfion divisions was
even more serious. Esfimates based on the desired productivity
of 100 urüts per day called for a staff of 148, yet only 47 were
employed. Rinehart expressed his frustration in a letter to Friez.
Stating that "your laboratory testing group suffers seriously
37. See Summary of Personnel Requirements, Physics Engineering Development
Project, submitted to the PED Committee and included in their minutes, 27
June 1945, file 152, box 143, Hancher Papers; PEDP Job and Salary Scale and
Job Descriptior\s, file 154, box 115, Hancher Papers.
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from lack of personnel and facilities," he ordered that resources
be consolidated to maximize producüon.^ ^ Despite the effort, the
OSRD never fully realized its goals.
On August 20,1945, soon after the bombing of Pearl Harbor,
Rinehart telegraphed Hancher and ordered him to "limit fur-
ther work under contract... to preparation of final report and
normal termination activities STOP Cease other work at once
STOP Terminate subcontract and place no further orders except
to extent that you or a subcontractor wish to continue for your
own account and work in process STOP Telegraph similar in-
structions to all subcontractors and suppliers STOP Letter and
instructions follow. "^ ^
Work stopped and termination procedures followed. Tech-
nical equipment and office supplies were sold, final reports
were written, and property leases were settled. Former SUI
physicist Alexander Ellett never retumed to the university but
became director of research for the Zenith Corporation. During
the war, the federal govemment had engaged Zenith in prox-
imity fuse research, and the govemment planned to continue
those contracts after the war.*' Friez resigned, effective October 1,
1945, left Iowa City, and designated Professor Jacobs to complete
the laboratory's shutdown with a skeletal staff. Afterwards,
Jacobs retumed to full-time employment at the uruversity and
assumed leadership of the nuclear physics program.
THE PEDP was an effort by SUI to support the national war
agenda. There were no long-term plans for it to serve the uni-
versity's interests or objectives; in fact, every effort was made to
limit its influence. The PED Committee administered the pro-
gram for the university and maintained the distance between
them. After the war, the project was terminated with little im-
pact on the fate of the physics department, at least in part be-
38. Rinehart to Friez, 27 July 1945; Employment summary of PEDP, in Sum-
mary of Personnel Requirements, file 152, box 143, Hancher Papers.
39. Copy of Westem Union telegram, 20 August 1945, file 152, box 143, Hancher
Papers.
40. Transcript of telephone conversation between Rinehart and Friez, 21 August
1945, file 152, box 143, Hancher Papers.
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cause no one in the program emerged with the ambition, ability,
and record of achievement to assume a place in the postwar
national science program, except perhaps for Ellett, but he had
resigned.
In contrast, at ISC Spedding sought to confirm his continued
dominance over the atomic research program at ISC after the
war. Spedding successfully lobbied to create a new mechanism
of management through which he could mediate the relation-
ship between ISC and the national research program he antici-
pated. On November 1, 1945, he realized his dream; the Iowa
State Board of Education established the Ir\stitute of Atomic Re-
search (IAR) and named Frank Spedding its director. From its
inception, the IAR managed the federal contracts that continued
to flow to Spedding's group even after the war.*'
Indeed, the government grew concerned about maintaining
its preeminence in the field of atomic energy after the war and
therefore continued to support research in that area. In 1946 it
authorized the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
to oversee that effort. The AEC built three national laboratories:
Clinton National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Argonne
National Laboratory located outside Chicago, Illinois; and Brook-
haven National Laboratory, built on the sight of a military in-
stallation. Camp Upton, in Yaphank, New York. In addition, the
AEC established other "centers of research," one of which was
designated the Ames Laboratory.*^ Adopting the model that
proved so successful during the war, the AEC contracted with
uruversities and industries to manage the labs and "carry out
the principal research operations."" The AEC designated ISC as
the contractor-operator of the Ames Laboratory and appointed
41. Harold V Gaskill, director of Division of War Research at ISC, to Charles E.
Friley, ISC president, 3 October 1945, Friley Papers; Friley to Drs. I. B. Fisk and
R. W. Wamer, directors of Research and Engineering respectively, AEC, 3 Feb-
ruary 1948, carbon copy in Spedding Papers.
42. Other laboratories established included Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory;
the Radiahon Laboratory at the University of California, Berkeley; the Knolls
Laboratory at Schenectady, NY; and, to some extent also, the laboratories con-
nected with the AEC's Hanford and Oak Ridge production plants. See Atomic
Energy Commission, Fiflh Semi-Anmtal Report, January, 1949 (Washington DC,
1949), 67.
43. AEC, Fiflh Semi-Annual Report, January, 1949. 64.
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Spedding its director. Similarly, the AEC solicited a research
program that continued to explore lines of research begun dur-
ing the war, in particular the study of the transuranic elements
and "fundamental studies on certain types of chemical separa-
tion processes . . . [and the] recovery of uranium and thorium."**
The Ames project and, subsequently, the Ames Laboratory
had a critical impact on the way those departments associated
with it developed and the way Spedding's influence within ISC
expanded. To be sure, Spedding focused the laboratory's energy
on problems outlined by the federal government. However,
Spedding's research interests and those of the laboratory he as-
sembled were compatible with the national research agenda.
Solid state and nuclear research, with particular emphasis on
the rare earths, remained central to the solicited research pro-
gram, and the resources that the government provided allowed
those programs to grow at ISC. Because the time and salary of
new appointments were split between the Ames Laboratory
and ISC, the hiring power of those shared programs grew, fur-
ther strengthening the departments of chemistry and physics.*''
Equipment and space provided by the goverrunent increased
the appeal of ISC's facilities. For example, ISC allowed over-
head funds paid by the government to be allocated for the con-
struction of a synchrotron in 1950, and the goverrunent financed
a nuclear reactor installed on campus in 1961. Both machines
supported the materials research program then under way. In
1948 the federally funded metallurgy building added about
65,000 square feet of space to the crowded ISC campus.
In contrast, at SUI, the solicited research program had little
impact on the character of the physics department after the war.
After the OSRD dismantled the proximity fuse program, the
physics department resumed its prewar agenda. A small but
growing emphasis on nuclear studies had developed in the
44. AEC, Third Semi-Annual Report, February 2,1948 (Washington, DC, 1948), 14.
45. The chemistry department entered a period of sustained growth between
1946 and 1959, when it grew from 18 to 5Í faculty members. More than half of
the new faculty held joint appointments in the department and the Ames Lab-
oratory. A simitar pattern was apparent in the physics department. It had 16
faculty members in 1946, 33 in 1959, and 41 in 1965; three-quarters of them
held joint appointments. See ISC catalogs.
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1930s.'" Ellett had led this effort, but with his departure, Jacobs
became its moving force. The university initially supported the
growth of the program. When department chairman Stewart re-
tired in 1946, the uiùversity recruited Louis A. Turner, an ac-
complished nuclear physicist, to head the department, and
during his first year the university authorized two new faculty
appointments in nuclear physics. However, faculty alone could
not build a first-rate nuclear program/^
The existing equipment for the nuclear group was dated and
in disrepair, and the imiversity failed to budget to upgrade it.
Five years of neglect, while Jacobs and his group were absorbed
with the proximity fuse program, took its toll A decade earlier,
the Cockroft-Wilson accelerator had facilitated several theses,
but its limited capabilities frustrated further research. A Van de
Graaff linear accelerator better suited the needs of the group, and
by the end of the 1930s Ellett had arranged for its purchase and
installation. When, after the war, attention once again focused on
making the Van de Graaff operational, the costs were staggering.
The irutial estimate of $30,000 for installation was inadequate;
the price now exceeded $100,000. Turner's inability to raise the
required funds indicated the limits of university support for the
program.'" Frustrated, Turner left in 1950 to become the director
of physics research at the Argonne National Laboratory.
In 1951 alumnus James Van Allen returned to chair his old
department. EHiring his tenure, the direction of the physics de-
partment changed dramatically. Van Allen had been trained
under Ellett in nuclear physics and, in fact, had worked with
Tuve at the Applied Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins Uru-
versity before returning to Iowa City. Soon after his arrival,
however, he became interested in cosmic rays. Grant money
and university support enabled him to develop a program in
cosmic ray research during the 1950s. In 1957 it surpassed the
nuclear program in funding and became the strongest program
in the department.*^
46. Wells, 12&-31.
47. Ibid., 151-60.
48. Atomic Energy Commission allocations in the 1950s eventually enabled the
department to make the necessary repairs of the Van de Graaff.
49. Wells, Annals of a UI Department, 167-203.
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STRIKING DIFFERENCES in the development of the research
programs at ISC and SUI account for these distinct postwar
legacies. At ISC, Friley welcomed the solicited research program
and allowed Spedding extraordinary latitude to manage it.
This, together with Spedding's ambition, personality, and capa-
bilities allowed him to become a particularly strong scientist/
manager. The successes of the laboratory under his direction,
both during the war and in materials and rare earth research
afterwards, further secured his position. From that position, he
effectively articulated the federal agenda to ISC and advocated
ISC's interests to the government. He assembled a research
laboratory that integrated the personnel, equipment, space, and
interests of ISC's associated science programs and the solicited
research program to the benefit of each.
In contrast, SUl's PEDP achieved only marginal success and
never fulfilled the NDRC's goals of production. To the extent
that this was due to management remains unclear, but unlike
ISC, authority at the PEDP grew increasingly diffuse. No scien-
tist/manager emerged to integrate the federal and university
interests. Consequently, the federal research program never
capitalized on the university's resources, nor did the university
benefit from the federal program. When the goverrunent termi-
nated the contract, the PEDP was shut down and the physics
department resumed its prewar agenda. In contrast, neittier the
research nor the associated departments at ISC ever retumed to
their prewar program, structure, or status. The solicited research
program left an indelible print on the associated science depart-
ments and the college.
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